

**PART- II**  
**CHAPTER 4**  
**CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS**



**SECTION 11 : OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS**  
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## **SECTION 11 : OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

***“Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity”.***

– Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, 1812.

### **Planning Considerations**

#### **4.1 Strategic Level.**

- **International Environment.** There exists a strong international public opinion against war between nuclear weapon states on account of the attendant risk of triggering a nuclear weapons exchange. Hence, any intended military action requires careful calibration of international support. Pro-active and aggressive diplomacy plays a pivotal role in preparing a suitable political environment prior to launching operations. Aspects such as economy, trade and commerce also come into play in such circumstances.
- **Synergy Between Diplomacy and Military Action.** Military conflict is usually the outcome of a diplomatic failure to ensure peaceful resolution of disputes. While coercive diplomacy may necessitate deployment of military forces as a prelude to offensive action, large-scale mobilisation of forces would normally follow a firm decision at the highest level to adopt the military option with minimum loss of time.
- **Conflict Termination.** Conflict termination requirements and a viable exit policy should be incorporated at the national and appropriate military levels as part of overall campaign plans.

#### **4.2 Operational Level.**

- **Relation to Military Strategic Objectives.** Operational level activity must directly contribute to achieving defined military strategic objectives.

- **Freedom of Action.** The operational level commander will dictate the nature of major operations, battles and engagements. Freedom of action to deploy reserves, assigning priorities and allocation of combat and logistic elements is, therefore, of critical importance. This freedom of action will, however, be within the confines of political and military constraints. While recognising these constraints, the commander will convey a clear statement of his intent which outlines his concept and establishes the objectives to be achieved by subordinate commanders within his theatre of operations.
- **Resources.** The resources made available to a commander to accomplish his operational objectives may be tangible (such as formations and units, combat and services support assets) or intangibles (such as delegated authority to achieve the given objectives). These give him freedom of action to exercise various options. Resources must be held at the level which ensures their most effective employment. Operational commanders must also utilise all civil infrastructure and resources available in their respective theatres to enhance their combat potential.
- **Civil Affairs.** The operational level commander will have certain explicit or implicit responsibilities for civil affairs within his theatre of operations. Movement of refugees and minimizing damage to civil infrastructure will have to be considered, in addition to his legal and moral obligations to minimize civilian casualties. Once operations have ended, initially the military may be the only organ available to exercise authority in the area and, therefore, responsibilities relating to civil affairs will assume greater importance. All formations entrusted with offensive operations in enemy territory will have an integral civil affairs element to handle tasks relating to control of the civilian population, management of resources and ensuring stability in captured territory. However, aspects pertaining to the transition to civil control must be built

into operational plans and be put into effect at the very earliest. This will ensure that fighting units are relieved at the earliest to carry out their primary roles.

#### 4.3 **Tactical Level.**

- **Employment of Firepower and Mobility.**

Commanders at the tactical level should ensure optimum employment of all the resources available to them and employ them effectively to fight decisive battles.

- **Earmarking Objectives.** All objectives at tactical level should lie well within the 'culmination point' of the forces earmarked to achieve such objectives. They should be in concert with, and part of the commander's overall operational design. Success should be achieved with overwhelming asymmetry and the use of firepower and force multipliers and with least cost to life and material.

### **Methodology of Conduct**

#### 4.4 **Strategic Level.**

- **Aim.** The military aim of war must be derived from the national aim and be clearly defined apart from being decisive and attainable. Each operation and battle must contribute to attainment of the overall military aim.

- **Terrain Considerations.** Since the Indian Army has to operate along vast borders of greatly varying terrain, it is important that planning for war, training and development of infrastructure is based on such terrain. Terrain is not neutral since it either helps or hinders the mobility of a force. The advantages and limitations of terrain should be identified and exploited for furthering own operations. 'Terrain appreciation' is, thus, a vital component in formulating plans. Military leaders must develop the ability to use terrain skilfully and should be able to visualise own and enemy forces on a given piece of terrain for maximizing own potential and

degrading that of the enemy. Implications of terrain on different operations of war are available in various General Staff publications.

- **Warning Period.** While it would be difficult to lay down any fixed warning period preceding a war, there will always be indicators and periods in which anticipatory action can be taken. All planning should aim to mobilise forces in the minimum possible time in order to take advantage of the many benefits that such a step offers.
- **Maximising Force Potential.** Ideally, this implies placing all available resources under one commander at each level. However, due to paucity, these may have to be placed under a commander only for particular phases of an operation or for a specified duration. Nevertheless, jointness is a prerequisite at the operational and theatre levels.
- **Balanced Force.** A force must be so composed and structured that its full combat power can be brought to bear in the most effective manner to achieve assigned objectives in the stipulated time.
- **Favourable Air Situation.** A favourable air situation over the tactical battle area, as well as the operational level battle area prior to launch of own operations is a decided advantage. Strategic constraints, however, may dictate the need for achieving objectives in a short timeframe, wherein both land and air campaigns may have to be fought concurrently. As a consequence a favourable air situation may not always be available.

#### 4.5 **Operational Level.**

- **Force Projection.** This includes mobilisation, movement and deployment. Mobilisation encompasses marshalling of manpower, equipment, stores and training as also activating part or all reserve components as required. This involves preparation of well-designed mobilisation schemes which should be

frequently practiced and rehearsed. Anticipation of mobilisation helps the Army to be physically and mentally prepared. Flexible logistic support is a prerequisite for force projection and should be catered for accordingly.

- **Shaping the Battlefield.** The purpose of shaping the battlefield is to create conditions which will facilitate the success of own operations keeping the ultimate aim in view. In the human dimension, psychological operations serve to unbalance the enemy, create discord and weaken his will to fight.
- **Decisive Operations.** Military operations which force the enemy to submit to one's will are decisive operations. These are most effective when the application of combat power and force multipliers is well-orchestrated and fully integrated throughout the battle-space. Enemy vulnerabilities should be targeted to achieve a clear-cut victory. Such operations will invariably be joint operations.
- **Protection.** This relates to the ability to conserve troops, information and equipment so that these can be utilised at the decisive time and place. It has relevance in both defensive and offensive operations.
- **Sustainment.** This is a continuous process which starts with mobilisation and continues till the end of hostilities. Towards this end there is a need for operational plans to be co-related to the available logistic support infrastructure.
- **Intelligence.** Sound and timely intelligence is critical for successful prosecution of war aims. It includes the entire gamut of obtaining information from various sources, converting it to intelligence by passing it through stages of synthesis and analysis, and the timely dissemination of processed intelligence to the user.

## **Offensive Operations**

4.6 Offensive operations are a decisive form of winning a war. Their purpose is to attain the desired end state and achieve decisive victory. Offensive operations seek to seize the initiative from the enemy, retain it and exploit the dividends accruing from such actions. These operations end when the force either achieves the desired end state or reaches its culmination point.

### **4.7 Planning an Offensive.**

- **Enemy Information.** Every possible means of acquiring intelligence and conducting surveillance must be employed to get accurate and timely information about the enemy. Of particular relevance will be his strategic thought process, intention, grouping of formations, deployment and location of reserves.
- **Joint Planning.** No operation launched in isolation can be expected to succeed in future offensive scenarios. Planning and coordination for operations should be undertaken jointly by all three Services and each should complement the strengths and offset the vulnerabilities of the other while formulating a joint plan.
- **Surprise and Deception.** With the availability of modern day high-technology surveillance means, achieving complete surprise will be difficult. Accordingly, more than the element of surprise, it is deception at the strategic and operational levels which need to be given greater importance as this could, more easily, contribute to success.
- **Simplicity of Plans.** Even at the highest level, plans for offensive operations, must be simple. A common sense approach with minimum complexities will help in making the plan workable and thereby ensure better coordination and flexibility. This is especially relevant while planning joint operations.
- **Nuclear Factor.** Future operations will be conducted against a nuclear backdrop; all planning should take this important factor into account.

- **Terrorism and Insurgency.** Similar to the nuclear backdrop, a war in Jammu & Kashmir may have to be fought against the backdrop of terrorism and hence appropriate measures for rear area security will have to be inbuilt into operational plans.

#### 4.8 **Preparation for Offensive Operations.**

- **Mobilisation.** Offensive forces should mobilise within the shortest possible time in keeping with the prevailing operational environment.
- **Force Posturing.** 'Posturing' by offensive forces should be planned at the highest level to aid deception and pre-empt the enemy.
- **Reliable and Foolproof Communications.** Reliable and secure communications, with inbuilt redundancy, provides flexibility in employment of forces and assists the commander in influencing the outcome of battle.
- **Combined Arms Battle Concept.** The capabilities of all available forces must be understood and the cumulative strength of every Arm and Service must be exploited fully to achieve optimum results. Similarly, their weaknesses must also be known so that they can be mitigated through appropriate employment or deployment; this will obviate the possibility of the enemy taking advantage of weakness, if any.
- **Directive Style of Command.** Offensive operations throw up unexpected scenarios and fleeting opportunities which should be exploited to advantage. A directive style of command gives best results in offensive operations.

#### 4.9 **Conduct of Offensive Operations.**

- **Shaping the Battlefield.** Adequate time and resources must be set apart for 'shaping the battlefield' before any offensive is launched. The results achieved will be dependent entirely upon the ingenuity with which firepower is delivered; this includes counter air operations and battlefield air interdiction, artillery



engagements and strikes by surface-to-surface missiles. Offensive IW, including psychological operations, must be exploited optimally to demoralise and degrade the adversary.

- **Creation of Superiority at Points of Decision.**

Absolute superiority across the board will be hard to achieve. Forces should, therefore, be deployed for the offensive in such a manner that they create force superiority at well-selected points of decision. Overwhelming combat superiority or advantageous asymmetry reduces the time required for achieving success.

- **Indirect Approach.** The essence of operational art lies in planning an 'indirect approach' to the objective. Concepts such as the 'turning move', 'envelopment' and 'infiltration' provide dividends out of proportion to the force employed when seen in contrast to direct, frontal or head on operations.

- **Tempo of Operations.** An offensive should generate such a tempo that it should unbalance and paralyse the adversary. The design of operations should ensure that leading elements reach their objectives before the enemy reserves can be brought to effectively bear on them.

- **Employment of Forces.** Pivot or holding corps should be prepared to undertake offensive operations. Accordingly, only the minimum essential forces should be committed to holding vital areas and the remainder should be grouped, positioned and tasked to conduct offensive operations to improve the defensive posture and create 'windows of opportunity' for development of further operations. A few salient aspects are outlined below:-

- **Strike Corps.** Strike corps should be capable of being inserted into operational level battle, either as battle groups or as a whole, to capture or threaten strategic and operational objective(s) with a view to cause destruction of the

enemy's reserves and capture sizeable portions of territory.

- **Contingency Planning.** Formations should be prepared to switch from one theatre to another in the shortest possible time. Equipment commonality and pre-planned, tailor-made logistic support should be ensured to facilitate such switching.
- **Employment of Heliborne, Airborne and Amphibious Forces.** These will primarily be employed to augment the offensive capability of conventional ground forces. They could also be employed for security of island territories, offshore resources and maritime trade routes.

## **Defensive Operations**

4.10 Destruction of the enemy's armed forces and breaking his will to fight is the basic aim of war. This can be achieved by major offensive operations. Defensive operations are, nonetheless, necessary to ensure the security of own forces, provide the base for strike forces and to create a favourable situation for offensive operations to be undertaken. Defensive operations must, therefore, be basically aggressive in design and offensive in conduct.

### 4.11 **Planning for Defence.**

- **Importance of Intelligence.** Acquisition of intelligence about the enemy is as important for defensive operations as it is for offensive operations.
- **Offensive Defence.** Defensive plans at every level must be offensive in nature. This implies that the enemy should be engaged effectively from the earliest available opportunity with every possible means in a planned manner. It also implies taking offensive action at every level, as part of a coordinated plan, to wrest the initiative from the enemy at every stage during war. A pre-emptive strike on his likely launch pads would completely upset the enemy's strategic design, cause imbalance in the disposition of his forces and wrest the initiative from him right from the beginning of

operations.

- **Pragmatic Appreciation for Defence.**

Defensive plans must be made after a very detailed and deliberate appreciation of the enemy's capabilities, intentions and interests, starting from the strategic and operational levels and culminating in the identification of threat at the tactical level. The emphasis at operational and tactical levels should be on effective surveillance, gauging of enemy intentions and retaining strong reserves rather than holding every inch of ground.

#### 4.12 **Conduct of Defensive Operations.**

- **Accurate Reading of Battle.** Accurate and continuous reading of battle by commanders at every level is a vital ingredient for fighting a successful defensive battle. Availability of real time information at all levels is essential for this purpose.

- **Improvement of Defensive Posture.** Every formation must have well-coordinated plans for improvement of its defensive posture. Depending on terrain conditions, these could range from expansion of its forward zone to capture of likely launch pads and dominating heights. Objectives for these offensive actions should be selected in a manner that ensures that these operations do not jeopardise and unbalance the subsequent defensive plans of the formation.

- **Heavy Attrition.** Once the enemy offensive has been discerned, all available firepower including air, armour, artillery and other weapon systems must be employed in a coordinated manner to cause heavy attrition and seriously degrade the enemy offensive.

- **Employment of Reserves.** The key to conduct of a successful defensive battle is timely and skilful employment of reserves to thwart the enemy offensive at the critical juncture in battle.

*“Hard pressed on my right. My centre is yielding. Impossible to manoeuvre. Situation excellent, I am attacking”.*

– Ferdinand Foch, *message to Marshall Joffre, Battle of the Marne, 1914.*

## SECTION 12 : SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

***“If your bayonet breaks, strike with the stock; if the stock gives away, hit with your fists; if your fists are hurt, bite with your teeth”.***

– General Mikhail I. Dragomirov, *Notes for Soldiers*, 1890.

### **Special Forces**

4.13 **Characteristics.** The Special Forces are specially selected troops who are trained, equipped and organised to operate in hostile territory, isolated from the main combat forces. They may operate independently or in conjunction with other forces at the operational level. They are versatile, have a deep reach and can make precision strikes at targets of critical importance. They are particularly valuable in the early stages of a campaign when they can create conditions for decisive operations.

4.14 **Concept of Employment.** Allocation of tasks to Special Forces should be handled at the appropriate level. Special Forces will have access to the maximum possible intelligence inputs relevant to the task and absolute security will be maintained at all times relating to their intended employment. The principle of ‘direct control and mission command’ should be exercised. Special Forces units will be tasked to develop ‘area specialisation’ in their intended operational theatres to achieve optimum effect.

4.15 **Missions.** Missions that could be assigned to the Special Forces are given below:-

- **Conventional War.** Strategic and tactical surveillance of vital targets, early warning of enemy activity in depth areas, denying strategic or operational assets and terminal targeting by precision munitions.
- **Low Intensity Conflicts.** ‘Seek and Destroy’ missions including trans-border operations.

- **During Peace.** Hostage rescue, anti-terrorist operations and assistance to friendly foreign governments.

4.16 **Planning Special Operations.** Keeping in mind the capabilities and far-reaching consequences of Special Forces operations, it is imperative that planning is conducted meticulously in order to ensure success. Various aspects of planning include the following:-

- **Purpose.** Commanders should specify the desired effect rather than courses of action.
- **Selection of Targets.** While the objectives are decided at the strategic level, commanders in the theatre of operations will evolve additional objectives for specific operational plans. Simultaneous assessment will be carried out by the air force and naval elements in case they too are involved.
- **Intelligence.** Intelligence agencies will be required to provide feasibility assessments prior to final acceptance of the task. Success will result from the precision with which Special Forces are employed against correctly identified enemy weaknesses.
- **Joint Planning.** Plans must be evolved jointly in conjunction with the Air Force and Navy where employment of their resources is involved.
- **Surprise.** In any operation, the force ratio would invariably be against the Special Forces; accordingly, achieving surprise will be essential for success.
- **Flexibility.** Special Forces operations are characterised by great flexibility. This is fostered and enhanced by improvisation, self-containment and detailed contingency planning.

4.17 **Equipping.** Because of the nature and gravity of their tasks with inherent risks, Special Forces need to be equipped with the very best of equipment and armament. The process of identifying needs and the pace of acquiring equipment for the Special Forces should, accordingly, be different from the rest

of the Army in order to ensure that they are always suitably equipped.

### **Conduct of Operations**

4.18 Security of plans, appropriate navigation aids and the support of air defence elements for aircrafts utilised to insert Special Forces into enemy territory should be ensured. Battlefield air strike and electronic support measures during landing will also form an important part of the conduct of operations.

4.19 **Insertion, Extraction and Recovery.** Special Forces will be trained for insertion by air, land, sea and inland waterways and detailed plans for extraction and recovery after accomplishment of missions are vital. Special Forces will be



prepared and trained for exfiltration and extraction from the area of operations employing various means.

***"It is just as legitimate to fight an enemy in the rear as in the front. The only difference is in the danger."***

**– John S. Mosby, *War Reminiscences*, 1887.**

## **SECTION: JOINT OPERATIONS**

***“It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms, which will insure victory”.***

**– Jomini, *Precis de l Art de la Guerre*, 1838.**

4.20 The nature of future warfare requires harmonious and synergetic application of land, sea and air forces. Joint operations are the most essential requirement of future wars and have to focus on the seamless application of all available resources to shock, dislocate and overwhelm the enemy. This necessitates an intimate understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each Service by the other two.

4.21 Optimal impact is achieved by evolving a joint operational plan which effectively integrates all designated resources. Joint operations encompass all actions required to successfully achieve a designated joint objective and involves activities relating to marshalling, deploying and employing the allotted forces. It also includes the intelligence, communication and logistic functions in support of such operations.

### **Principles of Joint Operations**

4.22 **Objectives**. Joint operations will be planned and directed towards clearly defined, attainable and decisive objectives so that the combat potential of all components is exploited to obtain optimal effect.

4.23 **Centralised Planning and Decentralised Execution**. It is important to retain the freedom of action of own forces. Towards this end, while planning and coordination must be centralised, there should be adequate decentralisation of command and decision-making to the lowest practical level.

4.24 **Unity of Effort**. Planning for joint operations integrates the combat power of the three Services and their activities in time, space and purpose. Joint operations produce maximum application of the overall combat power at the decisive point towards attainment of common objectives.

4.25 **Speed.** Modern weapons, equipment and communications continue to accelerate the pace of warfare. The joint planning and execution process must facilitate rapid decision making and action.

4.26 **Joint Focus.** Jointness in training, intelligence, planning, execution and logistics foster inter-operability and commonality of purpose in operations. Inter-operability of equipment particularly that of communications needs special emphasis.

### **Planning for Joint Operations**

4.27 Planning for joint operations commences at the level of the COSC and involves allocation of objectives and missions to designated successive levels of command of the Armed Forces.

4.28 **Joint Planning Process.** The COSC will nominate the Service Headquarters responsible for the overall conduct of joint operations and issue a directive defining the objectives, terms of reference and allocation of resources. An Overall Force Commander will also be nominated by the COSC. Thereafter, planning at various levels will be conducted as under:-

- **Theatre Level.** A Joint Operations Centre at the designated Command Headquarters will analyse the directive and will refer back unresolved issues, if any, to the COSC for a final decision. Thereafter, plans for surprise, deception and IW will be evolved and commanders in the theatre will issue their operational directives to subordinate formations.
- **Operational Level.** The directions of the Overall Force Commander will be analysed to decide on tactical objectives, lines of operations and decisive points. Joint staff at each successive level will facilitate optimisation and synergisation of joint resources.



## **Land-Air Operations**

4.29 Recent conflicts have demonstrated that spectacular successes can be achieved by well-coordinated and integrated joint operations. Though the extent of involvement of each Service would depend on the missions assigned to it and the prevailing circumstances, the inherent speed and reach of combat air power allows rapid engagement of enemy ground targets within and outside the tactical battle area in conjunction with ground operations. Air operations in support of land forces will be planned jointly to obtain synergistic effect in the specified theatre or area of operations. However, all such air operations should contribute towards achievement of the overall military goal.

4.30 **Land Operations.** These will be undertaken with the aim of capturing designated objectives and destruction of enemy forces. Availability of intelligence, deception, attainment of surprise, speed of operations and concentration of combat power at the points of decision will be critical for success of land operations.

4.31 **Air Operations.** During joint operations, air power is employed for conduct of air operations in support of land forces operations. The objective of air operations will be to degrade the enemy's air power and reduce its capability to interfere with the operations of own land forces, deny enemy land forces the ability to move unhindered, create an imbalance in his force disposition and destroy or severely damage his surface communications and logistic means. Air operations will be the most effective means of disrupting the move of reserves and substantially reducing their potential before they arrive at their point of application. Air operations include tactical reconnaissance, counter air operations, battlefield air interdiction, counter surface force operations, air defence, air transport (including strategic and tactical airlifts), airborne and heliborne assault operations.

4.32 **Joint Planning for Air Operations.** All Army and Air Command Headquarters jointly set up Joint Army Air Operations Centres (JAAOC). Air support requirements of the


land forces plan are intimated by JAAOC to the controlling Air Command in the form of targets to be engaged and degree of neutralisation required along with the timeframe in which to achieve these missions. Joint Operations Centre (JOC), at the level of Corps headquarters is the interface with designated air bases for providing air effort and liaison with JAAOC for allotment of air effort. Joint planning and execution facilitates quick response to air support demands of land forces to bring about synergised effect on the battlefield.

### **Airborne Operations**

4.33 **Characteristics.** Airborne operations are conducted in hostile territory for executing an assault landing from the air. These may be conducted at the strategic or operational levels, either independently or in conjunction with other operations. With its inherent air mobility, an airborne force is an important means to achieve simultaneity of force application and gaining a foothold across obstacle systems in circumstances in which other forces would require considerably much more time to be effective. Airborne operations can be launched at any stage of a battle.

4.34 **Missions.** Due to their inherent flexibility, airborne forces are capable of being employed on various missions whether these are strategic or operational. Operational missions are generally in furtherance of land forces plans and involve close cooperation with them. Though launched independently into the depth areas of the enemy, a quick link-up by ground forces is essential for the success of an airborne operation.

4.35 **Planning Airborne Operations.** The sequence of planning of an airborne operation is illustrated below.



4.36 **Conduct of Airborne Operations.**

- **Command and Control.**

- **Army.** During flight, the air transport force commander will be the overall commander; after landing, the ground force commander will regain command of the land forces component.

- **Air Transport Force.** The overall control of the air transport force will be with Air Headquarters, represented by the Air Command in the theatre which, in turn, will nominate a task force commander.

- **Conduct.** During the execution phase, attention needs to be paid to creating a favourable air situation and taking appropriate air defence measures. Suitable

deception measures and a rapid link-up are vital to the success of a mission.

### **Amphibious Operations**

4.37 Bearing in mind India's extensive coastline and many island territories, an effective amphibious capability is essential for safeguarding national interests and creating deterrence so as to ensure peace and stability in the Indian Ocean.

4.38 **Tasks and Employment Scenarios.** Our amphibious forces have the capability to project a sustainable presence in coastal and offshore areas. Amphibious tasks are essentially categorised as assault, demonstration, raid and withdrawal operations. These tasks could be undertaken in various scenarios including conventional war, defence of island territories, assistance to friendly littoral states in the region, peacekeeping under the United Nations Charter and any other special operations necessitating employment of an amphibious force.

4.39 **Command and Control.** On the basis of the overall situation, content and objective of the operations the COSC will designate the Theatre Commander concerned who will be responsible for the overall campaign. He will function with an integrated staff from all component Services. The three Services will nominate their respective component force commanders, ie the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), Land Force Commander (LFC) and Air Force Commander (AFC). Though the CATF will be the coordinator among the three Services during the planning phase, the CATF, LFC, and AFC will function with individual and independent access to the Overall Force Commander. However, during the embarkation, movement and assault phases, and until the ATF is dissolved, the CATF will exercise command authority over the ATF. Besides, the CATF will have command authority over all forces operating in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) including those that are not part of the ATF.

4.40 **Planning.** On receipt of the operational directive from the COSC, the Theatre Commander will issue an initiating

directive to the CATF, LFC and AFC. This initiating directive is, in essence, an amplification of the operational directive and contains the information necessary to carry out the task. Thereafter the tri-Service planning staff will prepare detailed plans based on which a formal operational order is issued; this constitutes the basis on which the three Services components would make their detailed plans.

4.41 **Conduct.** The assault phase encompasses the preparation of beaches for assault by naval guns, ship-to-shore movement of the landing force, link-up between surface and air-landed assault forces and landing of the remaining elements of the landing force for accomplishment of the mission. Detailed planning, preponderance of firepower, and coordination for speedy landing of tanks, guns, vehicles and infantry in correct sequence are vitally important for success of amphibious assault. Air defence and maintenance of logistic support throughout the assault also need to be ensured.




***“A landing against organised and highly trained opposition is probably the most difficult undertaking which military forces are called upon to face”.***

**– General C Marshall, *Planning for Sicilian Landings*, 1943.**

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**



**SECTION 14 : LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS AND  
COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

**SECTION 15 : NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS**

**SECTION 16 : UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS**

## **SECTION 14 : LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

***“Low-intensity conflict is armed conflict for political purposes short of combat between regularly organised forces”.***

**– Rod Paschall, LIC 2010, 1990.**

### **Strategic Framework for LICO**

5.1 **Aim of Military Operations.** When employing the Army in LICO, conflict management rather than conflict resolution will be the political objective. Therefore, operational objectives and intensity of operations should be oriented towards achieving a qualitative improvement in the situation which may not necessarily be possible in a short timeframe. It will be preferable to aim at low profile and people-friendly operations rather than high intensity operations related only to body and weapon counts.

### 5.2 **Timeframe.**

- **Precedence of Occurrence.** LICO may have to be undertaken prior to, simultaneously with or after the occurrence of a conventional war. In certain cases, these may be the initial step in the escalatory ladder of conflict that may have to be waged with an adversary bent on promoting and fuelling a proxy war. In other situations such operations may have to be undertaken after a conventional conflict while consolidating gains in captured territory.

- **Duration of Operations.** In order to ensure that the Army's efforts are effective and proportional to the task, LICO will generally be prolonged and will see a large number of changes in policy and directional imperatives. Commanders and troops executing the

mandate will move on after completing their tours of duty during the conduct of such operations to be replaced by others. It should be ensured that this should not result in an almost fresh start in any given area. Additionally, any tendency to resort to quick and seemingly efficient military-like actions which may appear to resolve an immediate local issue but, in all probability, may seriously hurt long-term objectives and future stability should be curbed without exception.

5.3 **Higher Direction.** The apex body of the higher defence organisation will be responsible for conducting reviews of the military aspect of LIC and advise the Government on the application of the military instrument of power. It will lay down clearly stated objectives to Army theatre commanders, coordinate functioning with other government and non-governmental agencies and monitor current and future changes in the nature of LIC with a view to re-calibrate the nature and tempo of own operations. In addition, Theatre Commanders may also receive direct inputs from the local administration. As distinct from conventional war, clear-cut directions in a LIC scenario may not always be available. Military commanders must, therefore, possess a high degree of tolerance for operating effectively in an environment of ambiguity.

### **Principles of LIC/Counter-Insurgency (CI) Operations**

5.4 The well-established principles of war are equally applicable to combat operations conducted within the overall ambit of LIC. Some other principles will need to be modified for the military environment. The commander on the spot will balance the application of each principle depending upon the nature of each specific operation. The commonly understood principles of CI and counter-proxy war operations are given below:-

- **Primacy of Overall Aim.** The scope and intensity of CI operations relate to the probability of finding political solutions. Therefore operational objectives will need to be oriented towards achieving a



qualitative improvement in the situation. Clearly stated operational and tactical objectives should be directed towards an equally unambiguous overall strategic aim.

- **Unity of Effort.** This will be equally applicable to intra-force as well as inter-agency efforts. Apart from the Army, a large number of police and paramilitary forces are often also committed in CI operations. As such, it will be essential to harmonise the efforts of each element and therein lies the importance of unity of command. Loosely defined, yet responsive, command arrangements may also need to be made within own forces.

- **Popular Support.** Popular support is the cornerstone of all CI operations. All actions, including military operations, should be undertaken to seek the voluntary and willing support of the people in the affected area. Winning the Hearts and Minds (WHAM) of the population through low profile and people-friendly operations is the most essential aspect of successful CI operations. In many a way they contribute even more than the actual operations.

- **Dynamic Conduct.** The conduct of military operations should break free from set patterns, stereotyped plans and rigid responses. The insurgents will invariably enjoy the support and sympathy of the local population and, thereby, remain ahead of the security forces in terms of information. As a consequence, security forces operations will generally be reactive. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that imaginative and innovative variations in time, scope and manner of force application forms the basis of all CI operations, to dominate the area, keep the insurgents on the run and gain physical and moral ascendancy.

- **Public Relations.** The broad spectrum of all military actions must be projected in a transparent, honest and positive manner for maximum psychological gains. The action of the Army should aim at respecting and protecting human rights, reducing the threat to the

people and inspire a sense of security. Any excesses by the troops, provoked or otherwise, or errors of judgement of commanders, must be candidly and promptly admitted and swift corrective actions taken in a free and fair manner whilst guarding against any adverse effect on the morale of own troops. It needs to be noted that the role of the media is critical in achieving a positive projection of military actions.

- **Code of Conduct**. The military code of conduct must be strictly observed by all ranks. Guidelines, issued by the Chief of the Army Staff, are given below:-

- Remember that the people you are dealing with are your own countrymen; your behaviour must be dictated by this single most consideration. Violation of Human Rights, therefore, must be avoided under all circumstances, even at the cost of operational success.
- Be compassionate, help the people and win their hearts and minds.
- Operations must be people-friendly and it should be ensured that least possible inconvenience and harassment is caused to the populace.
- Minimum force should be used and collateral damage should be avoided.
- Operations should not be undertaken without a police representative. All operations against women militants or terrorists should be conducted only in the presence of women police personnel.
- Be truthful, honest and maintain the highest standards of integrity, honour, discipline, courage and sacrifice.
- Sustain physical and moral strength, mental robustness and motivation.
- Train hard, be vigilant and maintain high standards of military professionalism.

- Synergise your actions with the civil administration and other security forces.
- Uphold *dharma* and be proud of your country and the Army.

• **Guidelines for Operating under Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958.**

Detailed instructions promulgated by the Adjutant General Branch, Army Headquarters for conduct of operations under this Act, will be strictly adhered to. Salient aspects which need special attention are outlined below :-

- Strictly adhere to the laid down rules, regulations and standard operating procedures when opening fire, conducting searches, arresting and seizing arms, ammunition, explosive and other incriminating material.
- Accounting and disposal of apprehended persons and material must also be conducted scrupulously as per prescribed rules.
- Provisions of procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure must be adhered to while effecting arrest, search of women and searching places occupied by women.
- Provide immediate medical aid to all persons injured during operations
- Maintain detailed records of all actions taken during operations.
- Promptly attend to the directions and instructions of civil courts. When summoned by a court, ensure dignified conduct and maintain decorum of the court.

## **Elements of CI Operations**

5.5 **Intelligence.** Superior manpower and weapons have to be supported by efficient intelligence back-up for success in CI operations. Concerted efforts are required to establish an intelligence grid; this is a long-term process and,

hence, continuity must be maintained even if units rotate through turnovers.

**5.6 Psychological Initiatives.** Psychological initiatives play a major role in a CI environment. The planned management of information and other measures are important to influence the opinion, emotions, attitude and behaviour of hostile, neutral or friendly groups in support of current policies and aims. Themes for psychological initiatives should be chosen objectively taking into account the perceptions of the selected target audience.

**5.7 Information Management.**

- **Media.** Media caters to various needs of the people in society in peace and war. With its unlimited capabilities and reach, it is an effective force multiplier. Since insurgency is a battle for the hearts and minds of the people, media is the most potent weapon for conducting psychological initiatives.
- **Electronic Warfare.** EW plays a key role in supplementing intelligence. Timely and actionable intelligence is vital. This will go a long way in isolating scattered pockets of insurgents and depriving them of direction and coordination from their controllers and supporters.

**5.8 Winning Hearts and Minds.** Security forces must seek popular approval for their presence in insurgency-prone areas. WHAM involves actions to gain the confidence of uncommitted elements of the population in addition to obtaining, preserving and strengthening support from 'friendly' insurgents. WHAM focuses on undertaking civic action programmes to present the Army's human face. These include providing education, creating medical facilities, construction and development projects in addition to social activities aimed at improving the quality of life and promoting better understanding and cooperation with local residents. Further, due consideration needs to be accorded to minimize inconvenience to the populace during conduct of operations apart from safeguarding human rights.

5.9 **Human Rights and Legal Framework.** With the Army's prolonged deployment in CI operations, there is a need to develop due respect for human rights, notwithstanding the tense, stressful and turbulent situations at the grass roots level. In this regard the Ten Commandments issued by the Chief of the Army Staff, as given earlier will be strictly followed.

5.10 **Leadership.** Good leadership is very important and will prove effective in ensuring that troops are convinced that the cause they are fighting for is just. Leaders need to display great tact and patience in coping with the difficulties in insurgency situations.

### **Conduct of Operations**

5.11 CI operations need to be conducted in two different geographical contexts, more so in proxy war situations. The first is at the border or LC itself through which the insurgent cadre infiltrates. The second is in the hinterland, both urban and rural, wherein insurgents establish bases and hides from which strikes are launched. Therefore, it is essential that well-coordinated operations need to be conducted to, first, check infiltration and then to deprive the freedom of action enjoyed by insurgents in the hinterland; this isolates them from their support base.

5.12 **Checking Infiltration and Exfiltration.** The porosity of our borders, difficult terrain and inclement weather conditions provide ideal conditions for infiltration. All possible measures must be undertaken to check infiltration and exfiltration. Incisive appreciation of terrain will help identify the likely infiltration and exfiltration routes, along which a multi-tiered surveillance grid should be established. Quick reaction teams should be based on surveillance centres to respond swiftly to any attempted infiltration and egress. In the long run, the success rate of infiltration attempts should be reduced so drastically that insurgents do not consider it cost-effective. Whenever an obstacle, such as a fence, is created, it should be backed by surveillance equipment and troops physically guarding it from both sides. 'Jungle bashing' by large bodies,

in the absence of intelligence, is the least effective method of operating in such conditions.

**5.13 Operations in the Hinterland.** These encompass the urban, rural and forest areas. Each of these has its own peculiarities which dictate the deployment pattern and density of troops in a given area. While inhabited urban areas will require firm but humane measures for population and access control and selective surgical operations based on specific inputs, more vigorous combat operations will be necessitated against well-established camps in rural areas and forests. The Army is more suited for the second category of operations. The deployment pattern and density of troops will be dictated by the overall number of insurgents operating in the area, their tactics and motivation, demographic realities, public attitude and terrain in addition to the prevailing political, economic and social conditions. It will be imperative to ensure own security and undertake measures to prevent the insurgents from exploiting vulnerabilities and, if they do so, to respond swiftly so that post-strike get away is prohibitively expensive for the insurgents.

**5.14 Small Team Operations.** Resources of the security forces will invariably be stretched over a large area of responsibility. In such an environment, operations based on small teams backed by good or specific intelligence increase the chances of contact with and success against insurgents.



Helicopters can be very effectively employed for various tasks in CI operations. CI units ferried by helicopters should be employed for tasks of decisive nature where speed and surprise are of paramount importance particularly in remote or inaccessible areas.

5.15 **Minimizing Casualties.** Unlike conventional war, CI operations are seldom time-bound. Casualties occur when operations are conducted without adequate intelligence, poor or inadequate standard of basic infantry skills and neglect of fundamentals. No effort should be spared to minimize casualties to own troops so as to maintain moral ascendancy over the insurgents.

***“Counter insurgency operations must, of necessity, be an intimate mix of military operations, civic actions, psychological operations and political/social action”.***

- Lt Gen SC Sardeshpande, *War and Soldiering*, 1993.

## **SECTION 15 : NON-COMBAT OPERATIONS**

***“He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious”.***

**– Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 400-320 BC.**

### **Types of Operations**

5.16 As mentioned earlier, non-combat operations are conducted primarily to assist the civil administration to meet sudden challenges to internal peace and tranquillity due to local disturbances initiated by a segment of the population or due to natural or manmade calamities. The suddenness and intensity of the event may catch the civil administration unprepared or unable to meet the immediate challenge, while the Army will be able to deploy speedily, provide relief and bring the situation to a state manageable by the civil administration. It must be noted that management of disasters is primarily a State subject.

5.17 **Maintenance of Law and Order.** Amongst all the duties generally performed by the Army in aid to civil authority, maintenance of law and order is the most important and sensitive. The lethality of weapons and the levels of violence encountered on such commitments have been progressively escalating with a corresponding increase in the frequency of the Army's deployment. Under such conditions, deployment and conduct of the Army has to be thought through and planned meticulously bearing in mind prevailing sensitivities. The Army should work on the well established principles of good faith, the use of minimum force and prior warning to the people when compelled to take action.

5.18 **Disaster Relief.** The Indian sub-continent is vulnerable to floods, droughts, cyclones, earthquakes and accidents. Disasters include earthquakes, landslides, floods, cyclones, wildfires, and epidemics on the one hand and accidents and man-made disasters on the other. The impact of these disasters is more predominant in under-developed and



remote areas, where facilities to handle such calamities do not exist.

**5.19 Humanitarian Assistance.** These programmes consist of assistance provided in conjunction with military operations and training exercises. Humanitarian assistance should enhance national security interests and increase the operational readiness of units performing such missions. These may include provision of medical care, basic sanitation facilities, repair of public amenities and facilities, education, training and technical assistance.

### **Planning for Non-Combat Operations**

**5.20 Levels of Planning.** The Army carries out planning for disaster management at the national, state and field levels. The Ministry of Defence, including Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff and the three Service Headquarters are involved at the highest level. Command, Area or Sub Area Headquarters will interact with the civil administration, police and other organisations at the State level, through periodic 'civil-military conferences'. Activities related to surveillance, preparedness and prevention should, nonetheless, continue even during normal conditions.

**5.21 Full Utilisation of State Resources.** All military commanders approached to provide aid must advise the civil administration to first fully utilise their own resources. They should synergise these with those of the Army once deployed. This is particularly applicable for duties involving maintenance of law and order particularly in circumstances when the State



Government may be of the opinion that the task is beyond its capabilities. Though this may result in the Army having to step into an already deteriorated situation, it is necessary to maintain its long-term credibility and effectiveness and hence need to avoid high-handedness will be the key guiding principle.

**5.22 Preparation.** In order to be able to respond to any call in aid of civil authorities, it is important for all command echelons in the Army to be fully aware of the availability and deployment of State resources as also have complete understanding of the existing infrastructure in their areas of responsibility. Equally important is visualisation of the likely role that the Army may be assigned in a specific area, given its physical and social peculiarities. The capability of the Army to undertake various non-combat operations will require an in-depth analysis and standard operating procedures should be worked out in consultation with civil administration. This will ensure that minimum time is lost in deployment of troops and that necessary training is imparted to own troops in advance for the purpose. The Army has charted out detailed allocation of responsibilities in all areas and all civil administrative officials are kept informed.

### **Requisitioning of Aid**

**5.23 Pre-Planned Aid.** In cases where rendition of aid can be planned, the civil authority will project its demands through the State Government and Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Defence which shall consider the demand. To enable local military authority to make necessary preparations, State Governments should keep the appropriate Army formation headquarters informed regarding ongoing developments and details of requests projected to the Ministry of Defence. Such formations or units will then carry out necessary preparations and make outline plans for the task, including allotment of troops, equipment and movement. Army Headquarters shall always be kept fully apprised of such details.

5.24 **Aid in an Emergency.** When time is short the designated civil authority may make a direct requisition to the nearest military authority for maintenance of law and order or for disaster relief. Local military authority will provide the necessary help without reference to the higher headquarters in exceptional cases where speed is essential to save human lives and property. However, in cases of a sensitive nature, prior clearance of the Army Headquarters will be obtained telephonically by the Command Headquarters concerned. The sanction of



the Union Government will be obtained at the earliest even in such cases by the concerned State Governments. During natural calamities and other serious emergencies when time does not permit obtaining sanction of the Union Government, the local commander may, at his discretion, comply with the request of the civil authority to the best of his ability. In such circumstances, the civil and military authorities will immediately report their actions to the Union Government.

***“Internal security related operations have assumed an equal significance as the primary task of the Army and these have now to be recognised as such”.***

**– General NC Vij.**

## **SECTION 16 : UNITED NATIONS (UN)** **PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS**

***“The United Nations, as a neutral intervening force and honest broker, remains an important factor in peace-keeping and confidence building”.***

**– Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *The Blue Helmets*, 1996.**

5.25 India has an enviable record of participating in UN peacekeeping missions, having earned the respect and admiration of all parties for the impartial and professional manner in which our forces have discharged their duties. As a stable and mature democracy it is incumbent on India to continue contributing to peacekeeping efforts of the UN.

5.26 A UN peacekeeping mission is formally established after a resolution is adopted by the Security Council and a mandate to that effect is issued. Based on the mandate, missions can be classified as peace-keeping (Chapter VI) or peace-enforcement (Chapter VII) as spelt out in the UN Charter. Chapter VI deals with the settlement of disputes by the Security Council by negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resorting to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means. Chapter VII covers the actions to restore international peace and security with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. These actions may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations or means of communications and severance of diplomatic relations, and if these fail, resorting to operations (demonstration, blockade and other operations) by air, sea or land force of member countries of the UN. When deciding to operate under Chapter VII, the consent of the parties involved need not be obtained.

5.27 **Principles of Peace-Keeping.** The basic principles of peace-keeping are consent of the parties involved, international support, unity of C<sup>2</sup>, impartiality, mutual respect, legitimacy, credibility and coordination of effort.

5.28 **UN Mandate.** A mandate emerges from a Security Council resolution and will be the basic document for the mission and invariably include the following elements : -

- Components of the mission and their tasks.
- Ceasefire or other agreements.
- De-mobilisation and re-integration of the groups and forces involved in the conflict.
- Maintenance of forces during de-mobilisation.
- Final disposition of the forces and groups and disposal of their weapons and equipment.
- Discontinuation of foreign military aid to all parties.

5.29 **Rules of Engagement.** This is an important document which spells out the quantum and type of force that may be used and the circumstances in which it is to be used. Unit commanders of the mission must ensure that all ranks clearly understand these rules. When applying the rules of engagement the basic tenets of minimum force, proportionate action and minimum collateral damage must be ensured.

5.30 **Mission Directives and Instructions.** A military contingent operating under UN auspices is issued 'directives' by the Force Commander and 'instructions' by his staff. All ranks must understand these.

5.31 **Functions of Military Personnel.**

- **Under Chapter VI.** Military personnel may function as observers or as part of a contingent. The primary task of military observers is to collect and disseminate information in the mission area. A contingent should be prepared to perform tasks such as security, protection, civic action and logistics. The contingent could be called upon to carry out non-military tasks also.

- **Under Chapter VII.** In such a situation the tasks (demonstrations, blockade or other operations) and functioning of the contingent would be similar to that while functioning as part of a multi-national force.

5.32 **Preparatory Activity.** Once the decision to participate in a UN mission is taken by the Government, detailed planning and preparation of the contingent will be a prerequisite prior to deployment. This will include reconnaissance, equipping, assembly and staging forward of the force, induction, supply of the force in the mission area and de-induction. Various staff branches at Army Headquarters undertake these responsibilities and the overall effort necessitates a high degree of coordination and cooperation for smooth execution of the mission. Detailed guidelines and instructions will be laid down by the branches concerned.

5.33 **Training.** There are some differences in the methodologies of functioning, as compared to standard practices in the Indian Army, when operating under the UN flag and the earmarked contingent must train for these. The contingent will be briefed in detail regarding the nature of mission and envisaged tasks. Before induction, contingents will train for aspects such as peace-keeping operations and CI operations in addition to language training (if required). Other subjects to be covered are:-

- Interpretation of directives such as Rules of Engagement.
- Contingent management at unit and sub unit levels.
- Public relations, media management and interaction with non-government organisations.
- Human rights, humanitarian affairs and legal matters.
- Logistic planning and contingent profiling under the new UN policies of wet and dry lease systems.

Pay and allowances including method of reimbursement.

***“He who is unattached to everything, and on meeting with good and evil neither rejoices nor recoils, his mind is stable”.***

***– The Bhagawad Gita.***